

Summary of Management Activities

Hewlett Fire

CO-ARF-000228

May 16 to May 22, 2012

Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forest
Larimer County, CO



Justin Meador



Rocky Mountain Incident Management
Team A
Todd Richardson ICT2

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I. Chronology of Significant Events

- May 15, 2012
- Most members of incident management team traveled to Fort Collins.
 - Team was in-briefed at 1900 at the ARF Supervisors Office.
 - Team established ICP at the Colorado National Guard Armory.
 - Delegation of Authority (DOA) negotiations began.
 - Incident was burning in the Cache La Poudre Canyon on the North side of the river, between Hewlett Gulch and Greyrock Peak, about 10 miles NW of Fort Collins. Fire is very active with some spotting. The only structures threatened at this time were along Highway 14 in the Cache La Poudre Canyon. Most of the residents between mileposts 110 and 115 were evacuated.
 - Operations began process of evaluating incident.
- May 16, 2012
- Incident Management Team assumed command at 0600.
 - Delegation of Authority was signed providing objectives and clear landmarks for the planning area.
 - Fire made a significant run beginning by 0700 and lasting well after dark. Spread was primarily North and East. Acreage increase for the day was approximately 4000 acres.
 - By evening, smoke impacted a large area of eastern Larimer County, and portions of Weld County.
- May 17, 2012
- Fire remained active overnight.
 - Operational efforts concentrate on the North Fork Poudre River area, where the fire front is approaching Bonner Peak and Bonner Springs subdivisions. Concern was for fire to cross the river and make a rapid approach to the structures in these subdivisions. An evacuation order was put into place for residents of these subdivisions. Evacuation order was lifted later that evening when fire did not cross the river.
 - Additional concern was for the Glacier View subdivision to the Northwest of the fire. Plans were established to defend these homes as well.
 - Additional growth was about 2500 acres for the day
- May 18, 2012
- An overnight weather system brought rain and cooler temperatures. Fire received between 0.30 and 0.50 inches of rain overnight and throughout the day.
 - Fire behavior was smoldering and creping. Size increase was 16 acres.
- May 19, 2012
- Residual moisture from previous day kept humidity high and temperatures mild. Fire behavior was minimal. Significant containment was accomplished. No additional acreage growth. Some

demob of resources began.

- May 20, 2012
- Incident was reduced to two divisions. No additional growth occurred.
 - More resources were demobed.
- May 21, 2012
- Minimal fire activity.
 - Heavy demob .
- May 22, 2012
- Final day with incident management team in place.
 - NWS advisory for high winds, low humidity, and high temperatures.
 - Minimal fire behavior.
 - Type 3 team established for duration of incident.
 - Develop three-day IAP for Type 3 IMG
- May 23, 2012
- Incident turned back to the Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forest at 0600.
 - Closeout with Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forest, Colorado State Forest Service, and Larimer County.

II. Meeting Fire Management Direction - Delegation of Authority

The following actions were taken by the Rocky Mountain Incident Management Team A to meet the direction provided by the Delegation of Authority signed on May 14, 2012.

Management Objectives

- 1. SAFETY - Give special consideration to risks associated with aviation operations, and firefighter exposure in areas of tree mortality, near snags, and during transitions. When in doubt, life safety shall take priority over acres burned in all strategic and tactical decisions.**

The new ICS-215A was utilized to identify significant risks and associated mitigation actions for the incident and was translated into operational period briefings. Special instructions regarding safety were sometimes included with pertinent Division Assignments ICS 204. Each IAP contained a Communications Plan ICS 205 and Medical Plan ICS 206 that were confirmed for accuracy daily.

- 2. Ensure safe passage of traffic on impacted County Roads where feasible. Minimize the duration of Highway closures and coordinate closely with the Larimer County Sheriff and Colorado Department of Transportation, particularly the Highway 14 (Poudre Canyon) corridor.**

- Public access into the fire area was restricted. These closures were enforced by the local Forest LEO and Forest Protection Officers.
- On May 18th a temporary road closure was placed on Highway 14 going into Poudre Canyon to reduce the potential for accidents or injuries to firefighters and the public while performing suppression operations. The road closure and evacuation was coordinated with the Larimer County Sheriff's Office, Larimer County Emergency Service, Colorado State Patrol, and Colorado Division of Transportation.
- Public evacuations were implemented on Highway 14 in conjunction with the highway closure. During this time many of the residents chose to stay in their homes and did provide an increased risk for exposure to accident and/or injury. Operations and the firefighters took the time to educate these folks on all aspects of the operational tactics. Further enhancing possible future relations.
- The Bonner Peak subdivision was also evacuated in order to provide for public and firefighter safety while the threat of fire crossing the North Fork of the Poudre River remained high. The homeowners were allowed back into their homes that same evening.

- 3. Maintain or enhance relationships with the private landowners, other agencies, Volunteer Fire Departments, (Poudre Canyon & Glacier View) and elected officials, as appropriate. Undersheriff Bill Nelson and District Ranger Kevin Atchley expect to be actively involved in public meetings and in dialogue with elected officials at all levels.**

Operations and Information shops were closely tied into local agency information and protection resources. All entities were involved and shared in the responsibility of planning and attending meetings with the public, continually informing elected officials through briefings and site visits. Local fire chiefs and their staffs were in constant contact during operations periods, as well as briefings when attended.

- 4. Manage the human resources assigned in a manner that promotes mutual respect and is consistent with the Department of Agriculture policy for preventing harassment.**

Plans Chief ordered an HRSP due to the increase in personnel and camp size (300+). Command staff was notified by agency union representative for the USDA employees to ensure compliance was being met.

- 5. Keep Cost effectiveness, use of critical resources and economic expenditures as an important part of your decision making process. Ensure that expenditures are commensurate with values at risk.**

Values at risk were priority in discussions relative to designing and creating plans to order resources, use resource, and to demob resources. Effectiveness is defined by this team as having the right tool for the right job using sensible and responsible fiscal practices.

Planning

- 6. You will be responsible for preparing a long-term implementation plan and analysis, including the long-term analysis of fire growth and trigger points.**

The incident management team had a Long Term Analyst for the first four days of the incident. Once it was obvious that there would be no more growth to the fire, the analyst finalized the plan document. It is available as a separate document to this narrative.

- 7. The Arapaho Roosevelt National Forest will create the original WFDSS, approved by the Forest Supervisor. Your team is expected to update and validate the WFDSS as needed. Your PSC2 has been given "Editor" access to**

the Hewlett WFDSS.

The incident management team has a Strategic Operations Planner (SOPL) on staff. A long-term course of action was uploaded into WFDSS.

8. Limit the number and duration of area closures. Maintain access where the public is not at risk from (or does not interfere with) fire operations or fire traffic.

State Highway 14 was closed to non-fire traffic for several days when the fire was active along the canyon bottom, and fire suppression resources were actively working along the highway. Once the fire activity diminished along the highway, it was reopened to the public.

One subdivision (Bonner Springs/Bonner Peak) was evacuated for about 10 hours while a burnout operation was conducted adjacent to the structures. Residences were allowed to return home that evening.

The Greyrock trail will remain closed until the Forest Service can evaluate the status of the trail and mitigate hazardous snags.

9. Release local IA resources first, in accordance with standard de-mobilization procedures.

Per negotiations with the local jurisdictions, most local IA resources were demobilized first. However, several local resources were kept assigned to the incident to provide additional training opportunities.

10. Provide opportunities for local trainees to complete or enhance ICS qualifications where possible.

Several local trainee resources were kept assigned to the incident, on a case-by-case basis. When developing the Type 3 organization, local agencies emphasized the interest to utilize additional local resources for training opportunities. Many of these individuals were incorporated into the Type 3 team.

11. Provide opportunities for local trainees to complete or enhance ICS qualifications where possible.

Numerous local trainees were already assigned to the incident upon the teams arrival. We kept most of these trainee resources on board throughout the incident. Upon development of the Type 3 incident management group, the US Forest Service, Colorado State Forest Service, and Larimer County were given the opportunity to fill the positions.

Operations

- 12. Structure protection is primarily the responsibility of Larimer County. Work with Larimer County Emergency Services, Poudre Canyon VFD and Glacier View VFD on structure protection plans. These resources should be included in your organization, strategic planning, daily briefings, and identified in the Incident Action Plans. Track resource costs in accordance with the cost share agreement which has been developed for this incident.**

Two structure protection groups were formed and used on the Hewlett Fire. They provided protection for the Hewlett Gulch, Bonner Peak and Poudre Park subdivisions as well as scattered residences along the Poudre River. Additionally, individual structure assessments were performed and aggregated into structure protection plans for these areas. Coordination with Larimer County Emergency Services, Poudre Canyon VFD, and Glacier View VFD helped to produce a better product.

- 13. Your resources do not have responsibility for initial attack. Requests for aircraft (assigned to your incident) to assist with IA outside the Hewlett fire perimeter will be directed to your Air Operations Branch Director, via Air Attack or directly from Fort Collins Dispatch.**

Aircraft were available throughout the incident to assist with initial attack outside of the fire area. None were ordered or used for this purpose.

- 14. Minimize the duration and scope of evacuations by returning homeowners to their residences as soon as possible. All evacuations will be coordinated by the Larimer County Sheriff.**

Evacuations were ordered in the Bonner Peak Subdivision and along the Poudre River. These evacuations were coordinated by the Larimer County Sheriff. Residences were allowed back in as soon as the fire activity allowed.

- 15. Use the WFDSS as a guide to develop appropriate strategies and tactics.**

The WFDSS was used to develop the suppression strategy and tactics to meet the objectives.

Information

- 16. Colorado Front Range fires provide additional challenges for information and large-market media interaction. Coordinate closely with Larimer County PAO, Nick Christianson and USFS District PAO Reghan Cloudman to disseminate information and ensure that frequent fire updates are communicated to all**

agencies, affected land owners, elected officials and the media. Frequent information contacts and meetings with the local community are expected.

Relative to the Delegation of Authority, the Information Section coordinated with the Joint Information staff on a daily basis. This included Reghan Cloudman, Forest Service Public Affairs Officer for the Roosevelt National Forest and Executive Officer Nick Christianson of the Larimer County Sherriff's Office. Executive Officer Christianson also regularly attended 0700 morning briefs where we were able to exchange information as well.

17. Key messages include:

- **Strategy on this fire is full suppression.**
- **Human life safety is the number one priorities for the fire.**
- **Management decisions will weigh benefits against risk and exposure to firefighters.**
- **Homeowners must continue to take personal responsibility for defensible space.**

Messages disseminated through public meetings, print media, radio interviews, television interviews, and the internet via the Inciweb website and social media outlets such as twitter, emphasized the key messages of suppression effort, the primacy of human safety, the assessment of risk to firefighters, and the responsibility of home owners and recreationists to maintain fire awareness.

Finance

18. Daily documentation of cost management efforts can be completed via a Key Decision Log. Release surplus overhead and resources in a timely manner.

Section worked with DOCL and PSC2 to retrieve information from meeting notes. Summarized information and shared with Command and General Staff to complete documentation for cost effective decisions. Demobilization of excess resources occurred throughout the IMT assignment as fire condition dictated.

19. All pending finance issues are to be resolved before responsible team members leave the fire unless negotiated otherwise with the forest. Key IMT may be required to return to the area after close out to resolve financial issues.

The Finance section has put considerable effort into the Incident Finance Package (IFP). We have scheduled a financial close out and will turn the package over to the Forest with explanations by unit of any items requiring further attention. All documents to be paid will be identified. A Finance Section roster is included in the IFP with contact numbers for all section members.

20. A cost share agreement between Larimer County and the Arapaho Roosevelt NF has been developed for this incident, and is available from the Forest Duty Officer.

The Finance Section has obtained a copy of the Cost-share agreement. Once sufficient mapping information by jurisdiction was available; the COST began prepared a daily report by the agreed upon split for incident cost. This report has been given to the incident IBAs and Agency Administrators daily.

Logistics

21. Travel should be minimized whenever possible. Spike camps are preferred over long trips or frequent moving of personnel.

A spike camp was used in division X, in order to allow the crew additional time on the line, and to reduce crew travel times.

22. Use sustainable practices such as combining passengers in vehicles and use of canteens rather than bottled water if feasible. Recycle materials whenever possible.

Sustainable practices were used whenever possible. The use of cubies for potable water used in spike camp. Batteries and cardboard were recycled.

23. Closely monitor the ordering and storage of hazardous material. You will be responsible for arranging for the disposal of surplus material and waste.

Hazardous materials were used and stored following forest policy. Fuel vendor was utilized for the refueling of all facilities, vs 5 gallon jerry cans. All fuel in the Supply Unit was stored within a containment apparatus. All vehicles were run through a car wash to reduce the potential of spreading noxious weeds. All water handling equipment was decontaminated with a 1% Clorox solution to prevent the spreading of whirling disease, and other aquatic invasive organisms.

24. Provide an accurate inventory of all accountable property and equipment prior to closeout or transition to the next team.

An accurate inventory of all accountable was kept in the supply unit, all property and resources are accounted for.

Resource Protection

25. Your National Forest Resource Advisor will be Matt Fairchild. Consult with him on suppression repair guidelines and rehabilitation where the fire burns on National Forest System lands.

26. Implement the appropriate resource protection measures for all fire operations and support activities. Key items to be aware of include the following.

- **Protect fisheries habitat by avoiding retardant and foam use within 300' of stream courses identified in the document and map provided.**
- **Noxious weeds are a concern in the fire area, document and map areas of significant disturbance by vehicles, equipment, staging areas or camps.**

National policy dictates that retardant and foam will not be used within 300 feet of stream courses. Pilots were reminded in briefings to avoid stream courses and no known exceptions occurred.

Agency Representatives

27. Work closely with Kevin Atchley who is the assigned Arapaho-Roosevelt National Forest Agency Representative for this incident. Either he or the Forest fire duty officer will attend your daily Planning Meeting. The following personnel can provide additional guidance and support as needed:

Contact was facilitated through morning briefing and afternoon planning meetings, cell phone conversations, and face-to-face discussion.

Mop-up Guidelines

28. Mop-up guidelines have been developed in a separate document from the Forest Duty Officer. Standards are dependent upon fuel type, terrain, burn severity, resource value, and land ownership. Please adhere to these guidelines, which are a strategic consideration that impacts suppression costs and reduces firefighter exposure.

Actions were inspected and reviewed by Resource Advisor.

Suppression Repair Standards

29. Repair of disturbance from suppression actions will be completed with emergency funds. Repair may begin when doing so will not compromise control efforts. Specific measures for firelines, roads, streams and camp locations will be developed by the Agency Resource Advisors as needed and documented in the daily IAP Division assignments. All repair will be completed prior to IMT2 demobilization unless negotiated otherwise.

Actions were inspected and reviewed by Resource Advisor. Local Burned Area Rehab Team is assembled by the Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forest.

Turn back Standards

30. Management of the fire should revert back to local forces in 100% 'contained' status (unless transitioned to another IMT). Specific standards and the residual management organization will be negotiated prior to containment.

Accomplished at end of shift on May 22, 2012.

III. Command and General Staff Comments

FIRE BEHAVIOR AND LONG TERM ANALYSIS – Sid Hall, FBAN; Angie Foster, SOPL; John Barborinas LTAN

A Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN) trainee is assigned to Team A. The FBAN prepared daily fire behavior forecasts and obtained weather forecasts from an on-scene IMET.

Background:

The Hewlett fire started at approximately 1300 on Monday, May 14, 2012 just north of the Hewlett Gulch Trailhead parking area off Hwy. 14 near the community of Poudre Park. The cause of the fire was an overturned camp stove from a recreational hiker.

Climatology:

A dry winter with very low snow pack and record setting heat during the month of March had dried available fuels. The previous summer's precipitation had created a heavy herbaceous fuel load that an early winter snowfall (Oct. 2011) had pushed down into a thick mat of available fine fuels.

Topography:

The fire area was in very steep, broken terrain north of the Poudre River Canyon with slopes of 70-120%. Hewlett Gulch was the western fire edge and a very steep (120-140% slope) face rises to the east of the Gulch. The north end of the fire ran onto broken terrain on the southern flanks of Livermore Mountain and followed Long Draw east to the North Fork of the Poudre River. There are several small, steep east/west drainages that run from the flank of Greyrock Mountain east towards the North Fork of the Poudre River and Seaman Reservoir.

Fuels:

The fuels in the fire area consisted of grass and shrubs (mountain mahogany & bitterbrush), fuel model GS2, on southeast, south, and southwest facing slopes. The fuels on north facing slopes consisted of timber litter (predominately Ponderosa pine, with scattered Douglas fir & white fir), fuel model TL8. Green-up in the herbaceous fuels and shrubs was beginning to occur, but the heavy, dead herbaceous growth from the previous summer had been compacted by an early winter snowfall into a thick mat approximately 2-4' thick. Live fuel moistures in mountain mahogany were around 135% (5/15 Redfeather RAWS), and live fuel moistures in the Ponderosa pine were around 80% (5/15 Redstone RAWS). 1000 hours fuels were estimated at 9-10% at the start of the fire. ERC levels had set new maximum level around the first of May at the Redstone RAWS and have been declining since.

Fire Behavior - Daily Chronology:

May 14, 2012

The fire started at the base of a west facing slope in grass and shrub fuels with a thick mat of dead grass thatch that quickly spread the fire to the steep slope to the north and east of the ignition point. The fire made aggressive runs in the grass and shrubs (mountain mahogany and bitterbrush) with flame lengths up to 20 ft. and moved to the top of the bowl in approximately 20 minutes. The fire also became established at the base of a northwest facing slope that was heavily timbered (Ponderosa pine, with some Douglas fir and white fir at the higher elevation) with a fairly continuous needle layer. The fire made an aggressive crown run to the top of this ridge (approximately 1000 ft. elevation gain) and spotted over the ridge to the east and south. Fire continued to move down slope and through the saddles to the north, east and south through the evening hours and was fairly active throughout the night. (Personal conversation with Tony Simons, Initial Attack IC and Scott Nutt, Initial Attack OPSC, 5/15/2012)

May 15, 2012

Overnight the fire moved east into drainage along Greyrock Trail and south over the ridgeline to the south facing slopes above Poudre Park community residences on the north side of the river. The fire stayed high along the ridge and suppression operations constructed hand line that checked the fire growth to the south. Around 1100 the fire became established in the bottom of the east/west drainage that leads down toward the Greyrock Trail and made crown runs to the south and north up the slopes of the drainage. The fire moved north toward Greyrock Meadows later in the day and established in the timbered north facing slopes south and east of Greyrock Mountain by evening. Fire was active through the night with RH recovery around 45%. An IR flight early morning showed a fire area of approximately 980 acres.

May 16, 2012

The fire became active by 0900 as the inversion lifted. Concentrated heat in timbered slopes around Greyrock Meadows and Greyrock Mountain started to produce a column by 1100 and make aggressive short crown runs on the north facing slopes. Cumulus buildup started to produce erratic outflow winds that affected the fire starting around 1200. These winds caused the fire to make a significant push to the northwest from Greyrock Meadows to the ridgeline on the east side of Hewlett Gulch. Steep rocky terrain stopped major fire growth, but spots ahead of the fire established on the steep west facing slope above Hewlett Gulch. A 180 degree wind reversal at approximately 1300 then pushed fire around Greyrock Mountain to the east into heavy stands of Ponderosa pine/Douglas fir/white fir which had isolated pockets of mountain pine beetle mortality. These stands started to produce significant crown runs and spotting that moved the fire further to the northeast, east, and south. During a helicopter recon flight around 1430, spot fires were observed approximated .25 miles outside the main fire on the north, east and southeast sides of the fire. Erratic outflow winds from thunder cells and mid-range spotting help move the fire from the eastern flank of Greyrock Mountain to the north end of Seaman Reservoir, approximately two miles, in three hours (approximately 50 chains per hour) predominately following a timbered east/west drainage. The fire also continued to move to the northeast and south following timbered drainages. A very large dark colored plume that developed throughout the afternoon started to shear off at approximately 4000 ft. AGL and stronger northwest winds moved smoke to the southeast

into Fort Collins area by 1800. The fire remained active through the night with RH recovery in the low 40s and overnight temperature in the low 50s. An IR flight at approximately 2230 showed a fire area of approximately 5090 acres.

May 17, 2012

Isolated pockets of timber in the interior of the burn started to become active by 0900 in the morning with individual tree torching and active surface fire behavior. Division X started burnout operations in the morning along the North Fork of the Poudre River from Seaman Reservoir north to Long Draw which cleaned up the irregular edges of the eastern flank. The fuels involved in the burnout were primarily grass/shrub with some isolated pockets of Ponderosa pine. Upslope winds from the east pulled the fire away from the North Fork and allowed that flank to burn to good solid black. The fire was most active on the northwest flank of the fire in stands of Ponderosa pine on the north and northwest facing slopes. A helicopter recon flight at 1500 showed there was active surface fire under these stands with 6-10 ft. flame lengths, with some individual tree torching. There are numerous rock barriers along this flank, so spread is somewhat limited on the ground. There were larger pockets of mountain pine beetle mortality which contributed to short range spotting up to .2 miles. The fire was quiet along the western flank with some isolated spots located on the steep rocky west-facing slopes east of Hewlett Gulch. Spread potential was low in this area because of the rocky terrain and sparse fuels. Suppression operations completed burnout along the south flank of the fire down to the Poudre River late in the evening. An IR flight at approximately 0230 on 5/18 showed a fire area of approximately 7673 acres.

May 18, 2012

Fire was most active on the northwest flank in Div. C later in the morning. Operations used helicopter bucket drops and air tanker drops to cool the fire's edge in that area and slowed the fire's growth. There was minimal fire spread to the northwest, despite a thunder cell passing over the fire and producing strong gusts up to 35 mph. Fire activity was minimal along the east flank along the North Fork of the Poudre River, with isolated pockets of heat in timbered areas well interior. The southern edge of the fire had one area of active fire about the river just west of the water treatment plant, but the rest of the south flank had minimal fire activity. Thunder cell winds continued across the fire area through the evening with gusty, erratic winds. An IR flight at approximately 2245 on 5/18 showed a fire area of approximately 7685 acres.

May 19, 2012

Fire area received .3-.5 inches of rain in the early morning with cloudy cool conditions throughout the day. There was minimal fire activity across the fire area with isolated pockets of heat in the heavy down logs and stump holes. An IR flight at approximately 0215 on 5/20 showed a fire area of approximately 7685 acres, no change in size.

May 20, 2012

Fire activity across the fire area was minimal due to precipitation from yesterday and overnight humidity recoveries around 80-85%. The few smokes that were visible were in

areas with heavy duff and large logs. An IR flight at approximately 2220 on 5/20 showed a fire area of approximately 7685 acres, no change in size.

May 21, 2012

Fire activity was minimal across the fire area again due to recent precipitation. The few smokes that were visible were in areas with heavy duff and large logs. No change in size.

OPERATIONS (TACTICAL) – Clay Fowler, OSC2 (PLANNING) – Ron Klatt, OSC2

Division Supervisors

Marvin Mathiesen, Justin Kincaid, Justin Whitesell, Kelley Mellot, Phil Daniels, Bill Easterling, Phil Perkins, Lance Robinson (t), David Ruhl (t), Larry Money (t).

Allen Farnsworth, Structure Branch Director

This fire was being managed under a full suppression strategy, therefore a long Type II Incident Management Team was ordered. Initial estimation of fire size was approximately 982 acres however it was estimated to be over 5000 acres at the end of shift on May 16th, 2012. Fire behavior was extreme at times and was consistently very high throughout the operational shift on the 16th. Fire behavior was influenced greatly by dry fuels, wind, low relative humidity readings, and dry thunderstorms.

May 16th the incident was short on handcrews, they had been ordered but due to delays caused from long distances to travel and crew availability there was a shortage on the fire. Extreme fire growth and spotting triggered the closure of State Hwy 14 and caused evacuations in the Bonner Spring and Poudre River Park areas. These evacuations triggered extensive structure protection in these areas. The Incident Action Plan accurately reflects the resources deployed. A false evacuation order was implemented in the Smith bridge area along the Hwy 14 corridor, this evacuation was ordered by a Strike Team Leader and was not issued or approved by the Division Supervisor, Operations Section or the Command Staff of the Incident Management Team. This problem caused communication and safety issues for line personnel and triggered an effect that caused several hours of extra work for three Operations Chiefs for the remainder of the day. The fire suppression resources were able to deploy direct attack in Division Z and Division A. Evacuations, trail, and road closures were in effect throughout the night as well as a Night Operations in the above subdivisions.

May 17th was much of the same as the 16th considering weather, fire behavior, and fire growth. More resources arrived on scene therefore the Incident Management Team was able to staff an additional division. By the end of shift on the 17th the fire was estimated at approximately 7000 acres. Evacuations, trail and road closures were continued as well as night operations. A second formalized Structure Protection Group was formed. Division Z and Division Y were able to burn out near Hwy 14 around structures from

Seaman Reservoir west to Division A/Z break. This firing operation impacted and burned private land and Forest Service land. It also impacted the Hwy right of way and IREA power poles. The power was off along the Poudre River for approximately 24 hrs. Division X was able to anchor the fire along the east flank from Seaman Reservoir north into Long Draw where they began direct suppression northwest towards C/X division break. The Incident Action Plan accurately reflects the resources deployed except for 5 engines, 3 water tenders and 2 strike team leaders provided by Larimer County via the local Mutual Aid Agreement. Resources in Division Y and Z along with 2 Operations Chiefs, Division Supervisors and misc. overhead worked an extended shift to complete firing operations along Hwy 14 to secure structures. Operations spent several hours working with Line Officers and land owners in the Poudre River Park area working on line location and specifications, these lands were located on State School Lands, private lands, and Forest Service administered lands.

May 18th proved to have to have more favorable conditions as the weather conditions moderated. Direct line was possible on the northern portion of Division X. Crews worked northwest towards X/C and were able to tie in the eastern flank of the fire. Division X was spiked out at the end of Long Draw Rd. in Division X. Continued firing operations were completed along Hwy 14 to secure the line. These burnouts were smaller in size. The west flank was scouted; this occurred in Divisions B and C. Night shifts were still in effect and the Incident Action Plan accurately reflects the resources deployed. Structure triage and evaluation began in the Bonner Springs, Hewlett Gulch, and Poudre Park areas. Power was restored in the Poudre Park areas and all power poles were checked out for damaged and repaired by the power company.

May 19th rain occurred over the fire area for extended periods. Rain amounts varied from .10 in the southern portions of the fire to nearing .50 inches along the northern divisions. The heavier rain amounts forced the Division X resources to abandon the spike early and get vehicles out of the area. This forced Division X resources to disengage and return to camp. Due to light fuels in Division X and the previous days line construction the rain proved as an effective tool for natural mop up. Very light suppression impact was recorded within this division. Division Y and Z continued structure protection, triage, and mop up. Division A began suppression rehabilitation. Divisions B and C were able to take advantage of the weather and anchor the middle of Division B and work the fire north towards Division X. Using a mix of cold trail, hand line, and securing the crews were able to tie in Division C to Division X. There was a portion of indirect line at the Division A/B break that dropped from the ridge to the bottom of Hewlett Gulch. This line was left in place and all firing operations were cancelled. Due to remaining heat in the area of A/B break where the crews were able to re-anchor in the middle of Division B there is small area of steep, rocky country with indirect line constructed around it. Air resources were utilized for bucket work and monitoring this portion of fire line.

May 20th crews continued to improve the lines that have been constructed, focusing on areas that showed some threat to existing fire lines. Structure triage and mop-up was still in place along the Hwy 14 corridor. Night shift was in place. The Incident Action Plan accurately reflects the resources. Helicopter crew shuttle was used on May 20th in

Division X and the crew assigned to Division X was able to secure all threats to the line and rehab all suppression damage within the Long Draw drainage. Continued suppression repair occurred in Division Y and Z. The Incident Action Plan accurately reflects the resources deployed. Division A was completed for suppression repair.

May 21st crews engaged the fire still with the benefits of the moisture from the 19th. The IMT combined more divisions and staffed the fire with 2 divisions. A,Z,Y,X were one division. Division X was in patrol mode and rehab was completed, Z/Y were rehabbed and mop up continued where needed. A few small smokes were detected very interior from the perimeter. Division A was also in patrol and rehab has been completed. Divisions B and C continued mop up and securing the line, Division B/C also began suppression rehab in areas that could be safely scraped and covered without compromising the containment of the fire. Structure Group was also engaged in Division Y/Z assisting and providing an support for the landowners and crews in those divisions. The Incident Action Plan accurately reflects the resources deployed.

May 22nd the fire had 2 staffed divisions- B/C and X,Y,Z, and A. The same assignments as yesterday were deployed with the exception that Pike IHC will construct a piece of indirect fire line in Division B. The incident action plan accurately reflects the resources deployed. This was be the last shift for the Incident Management Team.

Air Operations

The air operations played a significant role in containing and controlling the Hewlett Fire, as limited access and steep terrain were critical factors that contributed to the fire's growth and intensity.

Increased fire activity on May 16 resulted in the ordering of additional aircraft resulting in a total of 2 large Airtankers, 1 SEAT, 2 Lead planes, and 2 Air Attack platforms including 2 ATGS trainees. A total of 51,258 gallons of retardant were dropped in the fire area. Incident helicopters utilized included (2) Type-1s , (1) Type-2, and (2) Type-3s. On May 17, all incident helicopter operations were consolidated to operate out of Christman Airstrip located in NW Fort Collins, CO. Helicopter operations included water drops, crew shuttle, cargo transport, and recon flights. In addition, a CO State National Guard UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter with hoisting capabilities for medical extrications was made available at Buckley AFB.

The primary water source utilized for aerial water delivery was Seaman Reservoir, owned by the City of Greeley. A total of 155,460 gallons of water was delivered to the Hewlett Fire.

Inclement weather, including thunder cells and strong downdrafts, occasionally interrupted afternoon flights.

The planning of a PSD aerial ignition operation that was to take place on May 17 was never implemented due to favorable backing of the fire. Air operations were essential in

mitigating some communication issues by transporting COMM technicians and repeaters. 2 SAFECOMS were filed during the incident. The initial TFR was put into place on May 14, the ceiling increased to 10,500 foot MSL on May 16, and re-centered and expanded to 7 nautical miles on May 17.

SAFETY – Toni Toelle, SOF2, & Jeremy Kiesling, SOF2 (T)

The Hewlett ICP was staffed with one Safety Officer, SOF2 and one Safety Officer Trainee SOF2 (T). Safety briefings were conducted daily for all Command and General staff as well as operations resources assigned to the Hewlett Incident.

The new ICS-215A was utilized to identify significant risks and associated mitigation actions for the incident and was translated into operational period briefings. The ICS 206 was prepared daily and included in each operational period IAP.

On 5/19/12 the team “Incident within the Incident Action Plan” was approved by the IC and distributed amongst the team. Prior to this date, the firefighters on the line were run through scenarios to assess how they would deal with a possible incident on their division. These exercises were lead by the Line Safety and Division Group Supervisors.

The medical unit consisted of a MEDL and four line qualified Colorado certified paramedics who brought ALS medications including controlled pain medications from their home units. ALS protocols were under the direction of their home Medical Director. There were a number of qualified EMT’s and Paramedics on engines and crews through out the incident.

Poudre Valley Hospital provided two staffed ALS ambulances to the incident under a contract. One was stationed at Poudre Park and the other in the Livermore Fire Station area. There was one ambulance transport to Poudre Valley Hospital for a firefighter who suffered from dehydration and facial burns. The patient was treated and released and returned to light duty the following day. There were no medevacs.

Three people went to a local Urgent Care Facility in Fort Collins to be evaluated for the following issues: corneal abrasions, wrist and thumb tendonitis, and abdominal pain. All returned to light duty.

There were approximately 230 visits to the medical unit. The main issues were foot problems, poison ivy, allergies and prevention type medications (lips, sun exposure, and body powder). These were expected issues for the early part of the wildland fire season.

MEDL and Safety worked with Jim Lawson, USFS Region 2 HOS, to request a Colorado National Guard UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter with hoist capabilities to be on standby over the weekend incase we required their assistance. This request generated an A number for our helicopter resources. We hope this will result in a streamlined process to get the CNG helicopter launched in a short period of time to respond to a fire line

medevac extrication in steep uneasily accessible terrain. Luckily we did not need their services.

Two Paramedics from the Colorado Springs Fire Department struck a deer on hwy 287 north of Ted's Place with their department's Dodge Dakota. There were no injuries and the deer died. The vehicle sustained front end damage and was towed from the scene.

There were numerous daily sightings of rattlesnakes throughout the incident area. There was one incident of a helitack crewmember stepping on a snake at helibase. The snake struck the firefighter's boot, however there was no injury.

There were four Line Safety's assigned to the incident. Their duties included monitoring hazards and assessing the safety of the crew's assigned to each division. They also served as an extra set of eyes during critical fireline operations. Major fireline hazards included communication, driving, night operations, abandoned mines, firing operations, snags and rolling debris, steep slopes, aviation operations, fire behavior, bridge crossings, wildlife, dozer operations, night operations, wildland urban interface operations, weather, and public interest and recreationists within the fire area.

On the 16th and 17th of May the fire activity dictated that there should be more coordination between Larimer County Emergency Services, Team A, CDOT, Colorado State Patrol, Arapaho-Roosevelt NF Supervisor's Office, ARNF-Canyon Lakes RD, Larimer County Sheriffs Office, and Poudre Valley Rural Electric Association in the possible need for evacuations and temporary road closures for state highways and county roads.

On the 17th of May, the fire activity dictated the need for a night firing operation. This operation required that highway 14 be closed, this closure extended for two days after to provide separation from the firefighting resources and recreating public. During this time it was necessary to exceed the 16 hour work day threshold. Work rest guidelines were utilized and these resources came on later the next day, to mitigate for the prior day.

Safety along with Operations and an IC representative met with face to face or by phone representatives from the above agencies to plan and coordinate possible evacuations in the Poudre Canyon area (Poudre Park east to the Gateway Recreation area) and possible evacuations in the Bonner Peak area. We also met and discussed the possible temporary closure of CO state highway 14 in the fire area for fire operations.

On May 17th Safety working with Operations, and coordinating with CDOT, CSP, and Larimer County Sheriff's Office set up a temporary road closure on CO state highway 14 from Stove Prairie to Ted's Place to complete a firing operation to mitigate the direct fire threat to the structures along Highway 14 on the North side of the Highway. We also evacuated the homes within the firing operation area although most residents decided to stay at their homes. We closed the highway for two days but we were able to complete the firing operation and mop-up around the structures before opening the highway back up and letting the residents back in to their homes.

Also on May 17th Safety working with Operations and coordinating with the Larimer County Sheriff's Office and Emergency Services, initiated an evacuation of residences in the Bonner Peak subdivision south of the Bonner Springs road.

This decision was made based on the direct threat of the fire burning in the North Fork of the Poudre River Canyon next to the subdivision. The evacuation was short as we were able to let residents back into their homes that evening based on excellent work of the handcrews on Division X and moderating fire behavior.

On **May 19**, the fire experienced a moderately significant weather event which produced up to 0.5" of rain. This event raised concerns for firefighter safety and the crews from Division X were pulled off the line and back to camp. The main concerns included flash flooding, which would have impeded their egress thru a creek crossing to get out of Division X. Other concerns included slippery footing on all trail surfaces and associated wet weather related illnesses and injuries.

One of the biggest challenges on this incident was communication. These challenges ranged from coordination issues based on not being able to use and understand common language used on fire incidents. The other challenge was the radio communications as the fire was in an area of deep river canyons and deeply dissected terrain. The first couple of days presented challenges with communicating, but we were able to mitigate it by meeting face to face and relaying communications thru air attack and human repeaters.

All other fireline hazards were present and mitigated on a daily basis.

Threats to Firefighter and Public Safety Included:

A variety of specialized operations including hand ignitions, bucket work, logistical missions and high/low elevation flights associated with the incident.

Communications hazards included steep dissected terrain, very little line of sight commo, coordination with many partners, different radio systems and frequencies used, and spotty cell phone coverage.

Abandoned Mines were in the fire area, the one that was documented in division A had been encased.

Public Within/Adjacent to the Fire Area the hazards included heavy recreation use in the Poudre River Canyon corridor as well as high public interest in the fire itself, and numerous residences surrounding the fire perimeter.

Steep Slopes with 70%+ angled slopes were present with loose soil and rocks.

Fire Behavior was extreme with spotting, torching and crowning for the first three days of the assignment and then was moderated by moisture and cooler weather.

Wildland Urban Interface- there was numerous residences around the periphery of the fire and the river corridor along the fire's southern edge.

Firing Operations were used to secure the southern and eastern edges of the fire; methods used were hand ignition (very-pistols and drip torches).

Wildlife present on the fire included deer on the roadways around dusk, bear sign in some of the divisions, rabid skunks found in Larimer County, and rattlesnakes seen throughout the fire area.

Bridge Crossings were numerous in the Poudre River Corridor, some were concrete and some were wood, most were unable to support the weight of the fire apparatus and had to be inspected before use.

Weather was a factor when it was hot and dry during the first few days of the incident and then the wet, cool weather on the 19th.

Driving hazards were many and included long drive times to the incident from ICP, local and tourist traffic, road construction, livestock and wildlife on the road, as well as the fire traffic.

The crews constructed indirect line, improving roads and trails by limbing trees and falling snags. The crews also constructed direct line where feasible using saws and scraping hand tools.

The crews did an excellent job with safety during the heavy saw work (falling trees, limbing, brushing, and bucking) required to clean up the trails for holding the fire.

The Arapaho-Roosevelt National Forest established trail closures to restrict the public from the fire area. See the closure maps for more detailed information.

The incident worked closely with Ft. Collins Dispatch to provide 24 hour emergency coverage for night operations and Division X spike camp. The coverage was needed in conjunction with the ALS support at the spike camp.

A TFR was established over the incident to provide separation from the incident aircraft and local and contracted aircraft that frequent the local area. The Operations section chief, Air Operations and Ft. Collins Dispatch monitored the TFR for intrusions; there were four documented intrusions into the TFR. See formal TFR and flight hazard map for more detailed information.

In summary the usual firefighter threats were encountered and mitigated on this incident. Three reportable accidents or injuries occurred on this incident, plus two motor vehicle accidents. All personnel assigned to this incident are to be commended for this excellent safety record.

We would like to thank the Larimer County Sheriff's Office, Larimer County Emergency Services, Colorado State Patrol, Colorado Department of Transportation and the Poudre Valley Rural Electric Association, Inc. for their assistance during this incident.

Also to be commended is the local District and Forest for their support on this incident. This safety record was only possible with their help.

INFORMATION – Bill Kight, IOF2; Clark McCreedy, PIO2 (t)

During team transition, Rocky Mountain Incident Management Team-A Information Officers were in-briefed by staff of the Hewlett Fire Joint Information Center, led by Canyon Lakes Ranger District staff (R. Cloudman, T. Williams) and Larimer County Sheriff's Office Executive Officer Nick Christenson. The Joint Information Center was established at the Canyon Lakes Ranger District, in the Supervisor's Office of the Roosevelt National Forest. On May 16, 2012, the Joint Information Center was moved to the Colorado State University campus. On May 20, 2012, joint information services returned to the Canyon Lakes Ranger District. The Hewlett Fire Joint Information Center was staffed by Rocky Mountain Incident Management Team-A Information Officer B. Kight. Outreach efforts, and coordination with the Joint Information Center, by information officers staffing the Hewlett Fire Incident Command Post (ICP), located at the National Guard Armory, LaPorte, CO, included the following:

- Organization and facilitation of a public meeting held at the Cache La Poudre Middle School the evening of May 17, 2012. This included facilitation, preparation of meeting handouts, and one-on-one communication with community members following the meeting.
- Organization and facilitation of a visit to the Incident Command Post, and tour of the southern fire perimeter, by U.S. Congressman Corey Gardner.
- Organization and facilitation of a media interview (Channel 7 – Denver, CO) of Heavy Helicopter Pilot Aya Murakoshi.
- Organization and facilitation of a site media tour within the southern portion of the fire, attended by four television outlets (Channel 2 – Denver, Channel 4 – Denver, Channel 7 – Denver, Channel 9 - Denver) and one newspaper, the Coloradoan, Fort Collins, CO.
- Daily on-site media briefings conducted at the Poudre Canyon Volunteer Fire Department, and then later at the Livermore Volunteer Fire Department. Briefings occurred four times daily during periods of active fire behavior.
- Daily 'trapline' distribution of fire information at focal points along Hwy 14 through the Poudre River Canyon.
- Provided the Joint Information Center with daily updates for posting on the Inciweb website, and for use during radio media interviews by Center staff. Interviews by phone, for radio outlets, were also conducted at the Incident Command Post as well as the Joint Information Center.
- Preparation and delivery to operational staff of a social media policy statement.

- Provided MS Powerpoint presentations of fire-line photographs prior to the 0700 briefing for staff and cooperating agency personnel.

Services provided by Public Information Officers staffing the Joint Information Center included, during days of active fire behavior, *nearly continuous inquiries throughout the operational period* from the public and the media. Media outreach included daily interviews by phone for radio outlets, repeated updates to media outlets via e-mail and phone, and daily updates to the Hewlett Fire Inciweb website.

Logistically, within the Incident Command Post, the early lack of internet services limited the ability of the information staff to obtain, share, or deliver information in a timely manner. Cell phone and radio communications were frequently difficult due to the influence of terrain. Fully functional facilities and equipment for the ICP information shop were obtained toward the latter portion of the incident. Ground support was limited by their ability to provide boards for information; ground support lacked either hand or power tools capable of cutting lumber until the latter half of the incident.

Recommendations intended to improve joint information services, formulated within an After Action Review conducted May 21, 2012, included the following:

1. In the event that a Joint Information Center is activated for an incident, the center manager should be a position assigned to the Incident Management Team tasked with managing the incident.
2. In the event that a Joint Information Center manager is from a local agency, there should be a well-defined separation of duties allowing the center manager to perform their ICS function unimpeded by local responsibilities.
3. The Joint Information Center manager, and other key staff as available, should attend the all-hands morning briefing on the incident as well as the evening ICS planning meeting. Participation in the Information Section breakout meeting that typically follows the morning briefing would also facilitate communication between information staffs that may by necessity occupy different locations.
4. Joint information services must be defined in terms of roles and responsibilities; this should be included and well-defined in the Delegation of Authority.

Additional recommendations, formulated by the Information Officers assigned to the Hewlett Fire, included the following:

1. The development of policy allowing for the formulation of Information Strike Teams wherein Information Officers, with a common work history of team participation, could be deployed as a unit to complex incidents.
2. The recognition of an ICS position where local staff could be assigned to an incident management team as a Public Information Liaison with the intent of supplementing information services as a source of knowledge local to the incident. The roles and responsibilities of that position should be described within the Delegation of Authority and depicted within an organizational flow chart appended to the Delegation of Authority.

LOGISTICS - Loren Wickstrom, LSC 2, Ray Bergquist, Deputy LSC 2

The Logistics Section was fully staffed, with an additional four trainees. One trainee was able to finish his task book, and the others made significant progress. This assignment was complex, in that we had multiple land use agreements, engines, crews, spike camps, caterer, shower unit, and a full supply. The incident ramped up very quickly to nearly 600 fire fighters. Resources were demobed as the incident began to wind down. The transition from Type 3 to Type 4 was seamless, it helped that I embedded the Type 3 logs staff into the Type 2 logistics staff. These same local resources are now transitioning back to the Type 3 team. Fort Collins Dispatch, Expanded dispatch, buying team, and Arapahoe Roosevelt National Forest provided excellent service to the Logistics Section.

Communications

Prior to the Team assuming command of the fires, FTC dispatch ordered a starter system, S-21, a C1/L1 from NIFC. No starter systems were pre-staged at the Rocky Mountain cache, so it was air chartered from Boise.

After a suitable LZ was unable to be located, the C1 repeater was slung into Glen Rock off the Greyrock trailhead, and the COMT hiked in approximately 3 miles with helitack to put it in service on 5/16. An additional command repeater was then ordered as the fire made a run to the North and East. This C8 repeater was driven to Bonner Peak on 5/17 and linked to the C1. An L1 simplex link along with Tone 1 (110.9) is in place. This equipment was resupplied with a double set of fresh batteries on 5/22. (Refer to the attached Repeater Battery Change Log for status and coordinates). A remote kit was set up at ICP using the UHF link frequencies.

All of this equipment, along with 2 additional Command repeaters that were not used, a C12 and a C21, and an ample supply of AA and repeater batteries, were transferred to the Type III team.

The Verizon Critical Response Team (CRT) supplied 20 cell phones, 4 MiFi wireless hotspots, 8 data cards, and a long range wireless router at no charge to the incident. This represented a considerable cost savings. These were demobed at the transition to the IMT3.

At termination of incident, the IMT3 will need to contact the CDO and FTC Dispatch to demob the remaining aviation frequencies: AIR to GROUND A-10, 169.1500 and AIR to AIR A-9, 123.125.

All remaining NIRSC equipment will need to be demobed by the IMT3 and returned to Boise via the Rocky Mountain Cache. A waybill has been prepared and given to the incoming COML.

Facilities

National Guard Armory and Colorado State University lands were used as the ICP. The National Guard and CSU provided excellent support for the Incident Management Team and the fire fighters. The facilities unit was fully staffed, and had two additional trainees. FACL trainee was able to fully complete his task book. Innovations to alleviate over crowding of the office space included the use of a 10' x 30' office unit that was climate controlled, and wired for electricity, internet, and telephone. Yurts were used for additional office space. Base camp layout was designed to keep the camp compact and easily traversed between the sleeping areas, food service, shower service and parking. The initial camp crew assigned to the incident was split between Supply and Facilities creating manpower shortages in both units. Dispatch of a second camp crew alleviated these shortages in both units.

Supply

Supply unit was fully staffed for this incident. As of 11:00 5/20/12 approximately 45 request for local purchases, and 81 cache supply issue items were processed through the receiving and distribution desk. The lay out of supply was adequate, had the incident continued to grow, it would have been cramped. Support from the Rocky Mountain incident support cache was outstanding. Orders placed were quickly filled and delivered within a six hour time frame. The availability and use of two demobe specialist helped the supply staff tremendously in coordinating the cache returns.

Ground Support

The Ground Support Unit performed 225 inspections, had 5 rentals, 2 GSUL's, 1 EQPM and 6 drivers. Drivers delivered hot cans and supplies to the Spike Camp. Ground Support set up an aquatic invasive decontamination unit which saved money and a contractor weed wash was set up. A local fuel truck was used for only 2 ½ hours per day to save costs. It fueled pumps, chainsaws, the reefer and kitchen. All engines fueled at commercial filling stations. The purpose for this was that local vendors price for fuel was cheaper than the fuel sold by the truck at the ICP. The CSFS provided a forklift for free to use in supply. The CSFS GSUL performed mechanical repairs to save costs, no mechanic was ordered.

Food

Porta Pit, national mobile caterer arrived on May 16, 2012 and departed after breakfast on May 23, 2012. They served an average 1150 meals per day. Total meals served were approximately 8700. The highest dinner count was 539. Hot cans were utilized for one meal.

Security

Two Forest Protection Officers were ordered and manned the Hewlett Gulch and Grayrock trail heads. These FPO's averaged approximately 8 to 10 contacts an hour.

They also ensured that the crew buggies and fire fighting equipment were secure at the trailheads. Without a visible presence of security the public and media would have ignored the closure signs and accessed the trails in the fire closure area.

FINANCE – Paulicia Larsen, FSC2 & Liz Turner, FSC2(t); Nancy Hollenkamp, COST & Connie Mock, COST(t)

The Finance Section was staffed with the following positions: FSC2, FSC (t), TIME, PTRC, PTRC (t), EQTR, EQTR (t), COST, COST (t), and COMP (t). Of these positions, five are team members and five are regional resources. This is mentioned because only one of the non-team resources was available through the ROSS system. The remaining were name ordered resources.

The Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forest provided acquisition support for the incident. Christina Cook and Mindy Jiminez served as contracting officers. A four person buying team – Jeri Tavenner, leader – was located in the supervisor’s office in Fort Collins. The USFS ordered Denise Tomlin as IBA and when the incident was declared a state Emergency Fire Fund Fire – Janell Ray served as Colorado State IBA. The section utilized ISuite version 12.01.00 to record work hours for all resources, provide excessive hours worked, total hours worked on the incident and estimate incident cost.

Comp.

There were seven injury/illness cases reported. APMC was in place. One injury, a CSFS employee was seen by an OWCP doctor with one follow-up treatment scheduled as of this writing.

There were 13 claims filed. There were several reports of property loss/damage due to a high wind incident in camp causing broken tent poles and tent tears. There was one vehicle/deer accident with no injuries. One vehicle went off the road and sustained bumper damage. There were two claims for air dam deflector damage. An incident PIO claimed agency computer damage.

Cost

Summaries were prepared for the period of May 16-22, 2012 using the Cost Module in ISuite. Total cost for this period is estimated to be \$ 3,414,898. A Cost share agreement was signed by the Larimer County Undersheriff, Chairman, Board of County Commissioners, USFS Arapaho and Roosevelt National Forest, and the Colorado State Forest Service on May 19, 2012. The basis of the agreement is to share costs according to jurisdiction – resulting in an 80% share for the USFS (estimated to be \$ 2,731,918) and a 20% share for state and private land in Larimer County (estimated to be \$ 682,980). A cost projection was completed for the dates of May 23, 2012 through May 27, 2012. Cost per day is estimated to be \$ 96,619 for a total increase in cost of \$483,095.

Time

Recorded work hours for resources from six federal agencies, cooperators from Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming with approximately 32 Colorado fire organizations represented. Time was also recorded for 16 hand crews and 30 engines.

PLANNING – Flint Cheney, PSC2

The planning section was fully staffed with personnel and equipment (computers, printers, and plotter) to meet the incident planning needs. As part of the delegation of authority the team was tasked with developing a course of action (COA) planning document, additional staffing was requested and approved by the agency administrator. These resources included a Strategic Planner (SOPL), Geographic Information System Specialist (GISS) Trainee and a Long Term Fire Analyst (LTAN). They also produced a structure protection plan.

Representatives from the Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forest, Colorado State Forest Service, and Larimer County were particularly supportive throughout the incident.

Resources & Demobilization Unit

The Resources Unit utilized I-SUITE to manage resource tracking and the creation of the Incident Action Plan. Local and Arapahoe and Roosevelt NF resources were tracked in the IAP and in I-SUITE.

Each day, the Resource Unit Leader (RESL) coordinated the pre-planning (tactical) meeting with operations and safety. ICS forms 215 and 215a were utilized to document the planned actions, resource needs, safety concerns and mitigating actions

ROSS access to mobilization, demobilization and request list reports granted by Fort Collins Interagency Dispatch Center proved invaluable in tracking ordered and incoming resources especially during the transition from the Type 3 to Type 2 Incident Management Teams. Constant communications with Dispatch allowed for the timely placement, fills and demobilization of incident resources.

The Demobilization Unit was established on May 18, 2012. Access was granted to the Demobilization Unit Leader to ROSS, providing swift and complete demobilization of resources. The working relationship with Expanded was a positive and productive one.

Situation Unit

At the peak of the Hewlett Fire the Situation Unit consisted of the SITL, FOBS x 3, GISS x 2, GISS (t), IRIN, IRIN (t), IMET, and FBAN positions. The Unit's staffing levels

moved up and back down in roughly the same pattern as the IMT-A organization. On 5/15/2012 with the Hewlett Fire sized at 400 acres the Situation Unit was 7 positions, and the outgoing Type 3 Team consisted of 98 personnel. By Friday 5/18/2012 IMT-A consisted of 592 positions managing a fire sized at 7,673 acres. At that time the Situation Unit consisted of 11 positions. By Monday 5/21/2012 with the fire size remaining unchanged since its peak size of 7,685, the Situation Unit again consisted of 7 positions and the IMT-A had 239 personnel.

Maps products produced daily for the Hewlett Fire included: paneled IAP Maps, an “E” size for planning/briefing, and Public Affairs, a “C” size for Ops/Div; a 11” X 17” of the Infra-red info; a .jpeg for InciWeb and kml/kmz files used in Google Earth during morning briefings. The unit also produced a number of special needs maps of various sizes and scales including Fire Progression, Pilot Map, Transportation, FS pro, Trail Closure, Archaeological/Historical Sites, Fire History, Structure Protection, and Fire Line Rehabilitation. The GISS positions supported other IMT A units with by printing poster sized images of the 215, 215A, and Demobilization Plan. The unit supported the Long Term Implementation Plan document prepared by SOPL and LTAN with detailed structure address and response map packets and Management Action Point Maps. We also provided data for uploading into the Wildland Fire Decision Support System. The unit received extensive assistance and support with GIS data from the USFS, Colorado State Forest Service, Larimer County GIS, and local fire protection districts. IR flights were requested and flown daily. Costs of IR flights were mitigated by sharing costs of both the flight and IRIN with fires in Arizona and New Mexico. The IRIN posted daily to the ftp web site a 11x17 pdf., IR narrative document, IR image shape file, and a KML data file.

GIS products were produced in accordance with NFES 2809 (GIS Standard Operating Procedures on Incidents) and filed in extended file structure outlined in NFES 2809. Copies of the information will be provided to the cooperating agencies on a external hard drive.

The Situation Unit produced ICS 209 reports daily which were posted by 1800 to the FAMWEB site. The original 209 report (IC signature) was is in the documentation box and an Adobe pdf file posted to the team server.

Notes for improving efficiency with the Situation Unit

- Consider implementation of an informal calling tree to give as much “heads up” as possible for GISS’s.
- Consider adding GISS(t) to the roster as early as possible in the incident.
- The SITL needed to do a better job of establishing a map request protocol and screening access to the GISS’s by field resources (this is a fine line because we want field intelligence and feedback on map products)
- In developing the team roster, the PSC2 needs to consider the additional demands on the Situation Unit associated with a high public interest profile incident (Front Range).
- Some suggestions from Chris Ferner based on her experience working with the type 1 teams that would facilitate initial set up & production of the GISS’s upon arrival to an incident:

1. During the first operational period set up a GISS in a motel where they will have reliable internet, phone, and electricity and allow them to produce maps & have a runner deliver to ICP.
2. Upon arrival at an incident contact as many local agencies as possible i.e. District Ranger, BLM FO, NRCS, County/City Offices –anyone with a plotter & request use of their plotter to produce critical maps in emergencies (i.e. the team plotter crashes no power etc.)
3. The GISS Lead needs an external hard drive loaded with GACC-wide data.
4. The GISS Lead should have a pelican case of equipment that includes a GIS server, cables, switch, 11x17 printer so that map production does not depend on arrival of the trailer or the CTSP.





Incident Meteorologist

Overview: This fire was started at approximately 1300 on Monday, May 14th, 2012. The previous weekend had been an unusually cool and moist period, however near the fire had only received about 0.03-0.06” of rain. This spring had arrived early with near record warm temperatures and dry conditions, close to or surpassing the record year of 2002. The nearest RAWs stations nearby are Redstone RAWs (7 miles south, 6160 ft MSL) and Redfeather RAWs (14 miles northwest, 8214 ft MSL). Redstone seemed to represent the temperature and moisture parameters to the fire while Redfeather seemed to represent the winds.

Weather summary: The day it started, an upper ridge was building overhead. Redstone showed SSE winds of 7 to 9 mph with a few gusts to 20mph Monday afternoon, RH near 10% and temperatures in the mid 70s. Dry and breezy conditions continued Tuesday as the upper ridge moved overhead. Wednesday became warmer as a weather disturbance moved into the Great Basin and southwest flow aloft. Temperatures warmed to over 80 degrees with RH around 15%. A slight increase in moisture allowed some high-based dry showers and thunderstorms to form, which produced outflow wind gusts between 25 to 35 mph. A couple of showers near the fire sent out outflow gusts near the time the fire produced a column around 1500. Slightly cooler and more humid conditions occurred Thursday as the weather disturbance moved overhead. Red flag conditions were experienced Friday as a larger upper trough moved into the Great Basin with humidity around 15% and southwest winds gusting to 25 to 30 mph. A cold front moved down Friday evening followed by another front early Saturday morning bringing temps 20 degrees cooler, strong north winds, higher humidity, showers and a few thunderstorms. One in particular formed and moved northeast directly over ICP around 0430 with the northeastern edge moving over the fire. This storm alone put down about 0.2” rain over the fire, ahead of the whole day with scattered showers and humidity dipping only to 45%. Rain totals through Saturday ranged from 0.3-0.5”. Sunday had light zonal flow overhead with the beginning of a warming and drying trend but showed little if any growth. An upper ridge began building up from the southwestern states to warm

temperatures about 10 degrees Monday and humidity falling into the 20 percent range, with light winds.

Data:



Climate: Looking at nearby NOAA Cooperative stations, Buckhorn Mountain (7400' MSL) is 4.5 miles south of the fire, and Waterdale (5200' MSL) is 17 miles south of the fire. Due to the elevations of the station, I averaged their May climatic normal's to find the following for the fire at 6100':

Average high temperature: 65 degrees

Average low temperature: 39.5 degrees

Average monthly precipitation: 3 inches

Documentation

Incident records were managed based on Forest Service Handbook FSH 6209.11 – Records Management Handbook; Chapter 40 – File Designation and Disposition. Documentation Box was turned over to the forest and a receipt was signed.

Training Specialist

A training specialist was not assigned to this incident. Each section chief was responsible for working with the trainees within their own branch. At least 18 trainees filled positions as overhead. There were likely more trainees on crews, engines, and aircraft roles, but were not formally tracked due to the lack of a TRSP.

Human Resource Specialist

Karen Hartman, Uinta-Wasatch-Cache National Forest, Spanish Fork Ranger District, Spanish Fork, UT, (801) 342-5271.

There was no HRSP at the incident before my arrival on May 19, 2012. There were no impending issues. Some of the daily Human Resource messages presented in the IAPs included: personal rights and responsibilities, and inappropriate jokes.

The overhead team was extremely supportive of the HRSP position. The IAP messages and the briefing comments were well received. The HRSP was visible to the camp and crew. As of May 22, no issues or concerns were raised.

Computers & Information Technology

The server / client kit continues to perform reliably and sets up easily. Of course there are always a variety of minor issues, but no “show stoppers”.

My biggest concern for this deployment was management of the IAP email list. I was given a number of email addresses to add, and several were simply an email with no name or organization association. I see this as a serious risk for potential of distributing the IAP complete with field cell phone lists and other important information to the general public and would request a formalized process to identify full name and agency associated with each email added to the IAP list.

Having a second CTSP (and a CTSP Plans Chief) helped with the setup significantly and also mitigated my increased travel time. Of course having a Plans Chief who is also a CTSP helps troubleshoot issues as well.

Base site, Armory: As has been typical, the limited number of power outlets in older buildings presents setup challenges. The Armory had wired internet but access was limited to several key sites (NOAA, ROSS) due to DoD firewalls. DoD would not open necessary sites / ports on their secured network but did provide a temporary satellite system. Colorado State University had a campus facility behind the building and they were very cooperative in providing internet but the Rocky Mtn Fire Cache wireless bridge seems to have technical hardware issues preventing connectivity. Verizon provided several free cell access point devices to connect out for some outlying staff and these access points could be useful for future incidents. Late in the incident when the satellite system was pulled out, we experienced unknown network troubles on the static IP but switching to DHCP solved the problem. Overall, we were able to work well with some staff using Air Cards occasionally.

Noteworthy money savings: The team kit is much more efficient than a scattering of equipment and the unified equipment and wireless connectivity drastically speed setup time saving labor and improving efficiency. The DoD provided local internet and satellite were provided free of charge, and the State of Colorado offered up an emergency satellite connection free as well. Verizon continues to offer a number of free services to incidents with data and cell access that save significant money and should continue to be used. Colorado State University was also able to provide no-cost internet access to the team.

INCIDENT COMMAND –IC, Todd J. Richardson, Deputy IC, Mike Frary; IC (t), Chuck Russell

At 1900 hours on May 14th Deputy IC Mike Frary was notified by the IC Todd Richardson whom was in travel status in Reno, NV that the incident management team had been ordered by the Arapaho/Roosevelt National Forest for the Hewlett Gulch Fire. The Deputy IC was instructed to report to the Rocky Mountain Coordination Center to finalize the roster for mobilization. Through the negotiations with Geoff Bell Arapaho/Roosevelt National Forest Fire Management Officer it was determined that the roster would contain approximately 43 team members in the long team format.

Travel occurred for most members on the 15th of May, with a specified reporting time of 1200 hours and an in brief time of 1900 hours to take place at the Arapaho/Roosevelt National Forest Supervisors Office.

Approximately 1200 hours on 15th of May Deputy IC met with the A.R. Forest FMO to discuss additions to the roster which include but not limited to; Strategic Operations

Planner (Angie Foster) and Trainee Incident Commander (Chuck Russell). Geoff also expressed that he wanted to utilize as many local trainees as possible.

At the in-brief the Type 3 Plans and Incident Commander related to the incoming team the past and present situation including; current resources, weather, fire behavior and agency concerns. The incoming Type 2 Team Incident Commander and Deputy Incident Commander attended the Delegation Of Authority meeting. The IC's accepted the terms of the DOA with minor edits and determined the team would transition and accept command of the fire at 0600 on 16th of May 2012.

The Command and General Staff and their sections collaborated with their counterparts on the Type 3 team to ensure a smooth transition and limited disruption to the operations activities on the fire.

The Incident Commander ensured that the initial Incident Action Plan was completed and incorporated the elements needed for a night shift.

On 16th of May 2012 the fire progression exceeded capabilities of Operations and Communications which affected the remainder of the Incident Command Teams support functions (refer to other narratives for specific information). The most immediate and pressing issues requiring immediate IC attention were radio communications and appropriate dissemination of public information.

On 17th of May 2012 the fire again exhibited rapid rates of spread necessitating evacuations and road closures. Lack of clear direction and conflicting personalities led to a breakdown in the dissemination of timely accurate information to the public. At 1400 a complexity analysis was reviewed with the Agency Administrators that were signatories of the DOA. It was determined at that time to stay at the Type 2 level. The inputs and issues that kept the IC overly occupied triggered Todd to delegate his Deputy IC to stay engaged with operations and strategic long term planning and delegate his IC (T) to coordinate and fix the public information issues. At 1900 the IC (T) met with the PIO for the Larimer County Sherriff's department and the PIO for Team A. At the meeting it was outlined that there was a need to develop a process to ensure the chain of command was followed, trust was rebuilt, ensure coordination was happening with cooperators and that the J.I.C. was functioning at a high level for the public information dissemination. The IC (T) attended a county commissioner meeting at DazBoz coffee house in Fort Collins CO.

On 18th of May 2012 the IC (T) met with the incident PIO's, Larimer County PIO's and Arapaho Roosevelt PIO's at 0745. They were given a pep talk and a comprehensive outline of expectations for every position. Problems where encountered in communications on the incident between safety, operations and law enforcement regarding road closures and evacuations. In addition Operations proposed a long shift to complete a burn out on divisions Alpha and X-ray to secure the fire North of Highway 14. IC's Frary and Russell ensured that all functions where informed and could support the plan. They discussed the need for mitigation of work/rest as well as the ability to

staff appropriately the next operational period. The IC attended the public meeting at the Red Cross evacuation center in Laporte.

On the 19th of May 2012 IC(T) attended tour of fire with Congressmen Cory Gardner. Reports from IC (T), team PIO and agency representatives reported to the IC that there was excellent progress in the functionality of the J.I.C.

On the 20th of May 2012 IC and IC(T) took a recon flight of fire to approve glide path and transition schedule.

On the 21st of May 2012 Branch AAR's were completed and shared with the C&G. Incoming ICT3 Greg Toll shadowing team.

On the 22nd of May 2012 shadowing of type 2 team with the incoming type 3 team.


On the 23rd of May 2012 re-delegation back to the local unit and transition to the type 3 team. Break down of camp and travel for team members back to home units. Close out briefing and AAR with the local unit.

Lessons learned:

- Upon determination of needs for facilities prioritize co-location of all sections and or special unit needs.
- Include law enforcement officials directly in with Operations Section.
- Ensure Agency PIO representatives attend morning briefing and planning meeting.
- Ensure J.I.C coordinator/manager attend morning briefing and planning meeting.

APPENDICES

Hewlett Fire, CO-ARF-228



Total Costs thru 5/22 - \$3.4 Million

Incident Daily Summary Rollup

Printed: 5/22/2012

Resources where Kind has entry

13:55

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For Date: 05/22/2012

Incident: HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

Resource Kind	Qty	Daily Cost	Cumulative To 5/22/2012
AIRTANKER	0	0	264,518
FIXED WING AIR	0	0	84,594
HEAVY HELI	2	1,525	241,865
LIGHT HELI	1	8,230	82,767
MEDIUM HELI	0	0	60,076
AIRCRAFT Subtotal		9,755	733,821
DIRECT PERSONNEL	3	1,480	13,620
CAMP PERSONNEL Subtotal		1,480	13,620
HANDCREW-TYPE 1	2	15,438	341,098
HANDCREW-TYPE 2	4	22,660	698,409
CREWS Subtotal		38,098	1,039,507
DOZERS	0	0	7,189
ENGINES	5	9,435	296,584
WATER TENDERS	1	2,358	14,830
EQUIPMENT Subtotal		11,793	318,602
DIRECT PERSONNEL	25	13,467	178,758
LINE PERSONNEL Subtotal		13,467	178,758
Direct Cost		74,592	2,284,308
INDIRECT PERSONNEL	77	43,195	408,684
CAMP PERSONNEL Subtotal		43,195	408,684
CAMP CREW	2	9,800	32,733
CATERER	1	10,000	181,181
FACILITIES	8	7,344	44,671
MOB/DEMOB	3	7,840	142,520
OTHER EQUIPMENT	0	0	2,024
OTHER SUPPORT	3	2,116	18,408
OTHER VEHICLES	14	1,013	17,788
RESCUE MEDICAL	1	2,429	30,937
SHOWERS	1	3,058	25,482
SUPPLIES	2	12,800	177,259
CAMP SUPPORT Subtotal		56,399	673,004
LOWBOY-TRANSP.	0	0	8,034
OTHER EQUIPMENT	3	3,888	32,966
WATER TENDERS	0	0	1,978
EQUIPMENT Subtotal		3,888	42,978
DIRECT PERSONNEL	1	725	5,925

Incident Daily Summary Rollup

Resources where Kind has entry

For Date: 05/22/2012

Incident: HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

Printed: 5/22/2012

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Page 2 of 3

HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

LINE PERSONNEL Subtotal	725	5,925
Support Cost	104,207	1,130,590
	178,800	3,414,898

Incident Daily Summary Rollup

Resources where Kind has entry

For Date: 05/22/2012

Incident: HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

Cumulative To 5/22/2012

		Total
AIRTANKER	264,518	264,518
FIXED WING AIR	84,594	84,594
HEAVY HELI	241,865	241,865
LIGHT HELI	82,767	82,767
MEDIUM HELI	60,076	60,076
Kind Group Subtotal	733,821	733,821
DIRECT PERSONNEL	13,620	13,620
Kind Group Subtotal	13,620	13,620
HANDCREW-TYPE 1	341,098	341,098
HANDCREW-TYPE 2	698,409	698,409
Kind Group Subtotal	1,039,507	1,039,507
DOZERS	7,189	7,189
ENGINES	296,584	296,584
WATER TENDERS	14,830	14,830
Kind Group Subtotal	318,602	318,602
DIRECT PERSONNEL	178,758	178,758
Kind Group Subtotal	178,758	178,758
Direct/Indirect Total	2,284,308	2,284,308
INDIRECT	408,684	408,684
Kind Group Subtotal	408,684	408,684
CAMP CREW	32,733	32,733
CATERER	181,181	181,181
FACILITIES	44,671	44,671
MOB/DEMOB	142,520	142,520
OTHER EQUIPMENT	2,024	2,024
OTHER SUPPORT	18,408	18,408
OTHER VEHICLES	17,788	17,788
RESCUE MEDICAL	30,937	30,937
SHOWERS	25,482	25,482
SUPPLIES	177,259	177,259
Kind Group Subtotal	673,004	673,004
LOWBOY-TRANSP.	8,034	8,034
OTHER EQUIPMENT	32,966	32,966
WATER TENDERS	1,978	1,978
Kind Group Subtotal	42,978	42,978
DIRECT PERSONNEL	5,925	5,925
Kind Group Subtotal	5,925	5,925
Direct/Indirect Total	1,130,590	1,130,590
Grand Total	3,414,898	3,414,898

Incident Weekly Cost Summary Rollup

Printed: 5/22/2012

Include all

13:57

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Incident: HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

Incident

	5/14/12	5/15/12	5/16/12	5/17/12	5/18/12	5/19/12	5/20/12	Total
AIRTANKER	25,143	62,544	64,859	58,324	49,760	3,889	0	264,518
FIXED WING AIR	0	3,340	13,620	20,385	23,024	6,809	9,949	77,127
HEAVY HELI	0	45,574	49,489	50,521	62,102	25,394	5,686	238,765
LIGHT HELI	3,950	9,597	8,179	16,137	13,073	8,100	7,253	66,288
MEDIUM HELI	0	0	14,758	12,524	15,776	5,606	6,401	55,066
Kind Group Subtotal	29,093	121,056	150,904	157,890	163,735	49,797	29,289	701,764
DIRECT PERSONNEL	0	0	280	2,420	2,700	2,780	2,180	10,360
Kind Group Subtotal	0	0	280	2,420	2,700	2,780	2,180	10,360
HANDCREW-TYPE 1	6,840	34,410	34,773	57,073	52,388	55,505	50,298	291,285
HANDCREW-TYPE 2	21,028	93,074	94,317	117,330	99,271	104,270	85,896	615,184
Kind Group Subtotal	27,868	127,484	129,089	174,403	151,658	159,775	136,194	906,469
DOZERS	0	0	0	1,961	2,614	2,614	0	7,189
ENGINES	3,015	19,224	32,606	62,879	65,521	61,094	26,413	270,751
WATER TENDERS	0	0	0	2,153	3,143	2,393	2,393	10,080
Kind Group Subtotal	3,015	19,224	32,606	66,992	71,278	66,101	28,805	288,020
DIRECT PERSONNEL	3,603	15,318	22,043	28,642	28,660	29,675	20,697	148,639
Kind Group Subtotal	3,603	15,318	22,043	28,642	28,660	29,675	20,697	148,639
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	63,578	283,081	334,922	430,347	418,031	308,128	217,164	2,055,251
INDIRECT	7,430	34,196	48,271	55,705	59,831	57,701	53,148	316,283
Kind Group Subtotal	7,430	34,196	48,271	55,705	59,831	57,701	53,148	316,283
CAMP CREW	0	0	2,132	3,140	4,468	4,477	4,477	18,694
CATERER	0	7,220	31,072	27,272	35,350	31,812	22,807	155,533
FACILITIES	250	5,074	4,890	5,982	5,922	4,890	5,160	32,167
MOB/DEMOB	0	14,280	32,760	22,260	20,300	700	25,760	116,060
OTHER EQUIPMENT	0	0	2,024	0	0	0	0	2,024
OTHER SUPPORT	0	2,026	3,776	2,026	2,116	2,116	2,116	14,176
OTHER VEHICLES	302	2,281	2,308	3,128	2,859	2,797	1,679	15,353
RESCUE MEDICAL	0	1,100	2,567	5,133	5,042	4,950	4,904	23,696
SHOWERS	0	0	7,004	3,058	3,123	3,123	3,058	19,366
SUPPLIES	0	200	23,761	30,416	42,299	37,283	18,550	152,509
Kind Group Subtotal	552	32,181	112,294	102,415	121,478	92,148	88,511	549,578
LOWBOY-TRANSP.	0	0	0	1,854	2,472	2,472	1,236	8,034
OTHER EQUIPMENT	0	350	3,020	4,434	6,782	5,302	5,302	25,190
WATER TENDERS	0	1,978	0	0	0	0	0	1,978
Kind Group Subtotal	0	2,328	3,020	6,288	9,254	7,774	6,538	35,202
DIRECT PERSONNEL	0	725	750	775	775	725	725	4,475
Kind Group Subtotal	0	725	750	775	775	725	725	4,475
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	7,982	69,429	164,335	165,183	191,338	158,349	148,922	905,538
Daily Total	71,560	352,511	499,257	595,530	609,369	466,476	366,086	2,960,789

Incident Weekly Cost Summary Rollup

Include all

Incident: HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

Incident

	5/21/12	5/22/12	Total
FIXED WING AIR	7,467	0	7,467
HEAVY HELI	1,575	1,525	3,100
LIGHT HELI	8,250	8,230	16,480
MEDIUM HELI	5,010	0	5,010
Kind Group Subtotal	22,302	9,755	32,057
DIRECT PERSONNEL	1,780	1,480	3,260
Kind Group Subtotal	1,780	1,480	3,260
HANDCREW-TYPE 1	34,375	15,438	49,813
HANDCREW-TYPE 2	60,565	22,660	83,225
Kind Group Subtotal	94,940	38,098	133,038
ENGINES	16,398	9,435	25,833
WATER TENDERS	2,393	2,358	4,750
Kind Group Subtotal	18,790	11,793	30,583
DIRECT PERSONNEL	16,652	13,467	30,119
Kind Group Subtotal	16,652	13,467	30,119
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	154,464	74,592	229,056
INDIRECT	49,206	43,195	92,401
Kind Group Subtotal	49,206	43,195	92,401
CAMP CREW	4,240	9,800	14,040
CATERER	15,648	10,000	25,648
FACILITIES	5,160	7,344	12,504
MOB/DEMOB	18,620	7,840	26,460
OTHER SUPPORT	2,116	2,116	4,232
OTHER VEHICLES	1,422	1,013	2,435
RESCUE MEDICAL	4,812	2,429	7,242
SHOWERS	3,058	3,058	6,116
SUPPLIES	11,950	12,800	24,750
Kind Group Subtotal	67,026	56,399	123,426
OTHER EQUIPMENT	3,888	3,888	7,776
Kind Group Subtotal	3,888	3,888	7,776
DIRECT PERSONNEL	725	725	1,450
Kind Group Subtotal	725	725	1,450
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	120,845	104,207	225,052
Daily Total	275,309	178,800	454,109

Incident Weekly Cost Summary Rollup

Include all

Incident: HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

Incident

	Total
AIRTANKER	264,518
FIXED WING AIR	84,594
HEAVY HELI	241,865
LIGHT HELI	82,767
MEDIUM HELI	60,076
Kind Group Subtotal	733,821
DIRECT PERSONNEL	13,620
Kind Group Subtotal	13,620
HANDCREW-TYPE 1	341,098
HANDCREW-TYPE 2	698,409
Kind Group Subtotal	1,039,507
DOZERS	7,189
ENGINES	296,584
WATER TENDERS	14,830
Kind Group Subtotal	318,602
DIRECT PERSONNEL	178,758
Kind Group Subtotal	178,758
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	2,284,308
INDIRECT	408,684
Kind Group Subtotal	408,684
CAMP CREW	32,733
CATERER	181,181
FACILITIES	44,671
MOB/DEMOB	142,520
OTHER EQUIPMENT	2,024
OTHER SUPPORT	18,408
OTHER VEHICLES	17,788
RESCUE MEDICAL	30,937
SHOWERS	25,482
SUPPLIES	177,259
Kind Group Subtotal	673,004
LOWBOY-TRANSP.	8,034
OTHER EQUIPMENT	32,966
WATER TENDERS	1,978
Kind Group Subtotal	42,978
DIRECT PERSONNEL	5,925
Kind Group Subtotal	5,925
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	1,130,590
Total	3,414,898

Incident Weekly Cost Summary Rollup

Include all

Incident: HEWLETT (CO-ARF-000228)

		Total
MEDIUM HELI	60,076	60,076
LIGHT HELI	82,767	82,767
HEAVY HELI	241,865	241,865
FIXED WING AIR	84,594	84,594
AIRTANKER	264,518	264,518
Kind Group Subtotal	733,821	733,821
DIRECT PERSONNEL	13,620	13,620
Kind Group Subtotal	13,620	13,620
HANDCREW-TYPE 2	698,409	698,409
HANDCREW-TYPE 1	341,098	341,098
Kind Group Subtotal	1,039,507	1,039,507
WATER TENDERS	14,830	14,830
ENGINES	296,584	296,584
DOZERS	7,189	7,189
Kind Group Subtotal	318,602	318,602
DIRECT PERSONNEL	178,758	178,758
Kind Group Subtotal	178,758	178,758
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	2,284,308	2,284,308
INDIRECT PERSONNEL	408,684	408,684
Kind Group Subtotal	408,684	408,684
SUPPLIES	177,259	177,259
SHOWERS	25,482	25,482
RESCUE MEDICAL	30,937	30,937
OTHER VEHICLES	17,788	17,788
OTHER SUPPORT	18,408	18,408
OTHER EQUIPMENT	2,024	2,024
MOB/DEMOB	142,520	142,520
FACILITIES	44,671	44,671
CATERER	181,181	181,181
CAMP CREW	32,733	32,733
Kind Group Subtotal	673,004	673,004
WATER TENDERS	1,978	1,978
OTHER EQUIPMENT	32,966	32,966
LOWBOY-TRANSP.	8,034	8,034
Kind Group Subtotal	42,978	42,978
DIRECT PERSONNEL	5,925	5,925
Kind Group Subtotal	5,925	5,925
Direct/Indirect Subtotal	1,130,590	1,130,590
Grand Total	3,414,898	3,414,898

Cost Containment Measures

1. Utilized the National Guard Armory for the ICP at a low daily rate of \$250. A similar facility may have resulted in a daily charge of \$500. Cost savings of \$2,250.
2. Used the CSU facilities for Helibase and Information at no cost. Similar facilities may have resulted in a daily charge of \$500 per facility. Cost savings of \$9,000.
3. Utilized local resources for key overhead positions reducing mobilization cost. Cost savings of \$10,360.
4. The IR flight cost for the Hewlett Fire was shared between 3 fires in New Mexico and Arizona. Cost savings of \$8,215.
5. CSU provided camp security for the ICP and Helibase. Cost savings of \$8,640.
6. When complexity reached a threshold between Type 2 and Type 1, C&G performed an internal assessment. All complexity measures were reviewed and the IMT 2 determined that the situation continued to be within their management capability. Mob/Demob costs vs. staffing for appropriate span of control and maintaining current facilities. Achieved significant savings.
7. Released for demobilization the more expensive resources first. The type 6 engines cost approximately \$900 a day less than the type three engines we had on the Hewlett Fire. The Team saved 10 engine days at \$900 a day resulting in a savings of \$9,000 and five crew days at \$5,300 a day resulting in a net savings of \$26,500.
8. Utilized a National Guard, hoist capable rescue helicopter for the incident. While on call during the week there was no stand by expense for this service. Weekend staffing costs were \$1000.00 per day. Total cost to date \$2000.00. Cost savings of \$21,000.
9. Utilized natural barriers to the extent possible minimizing resource damage and expediting line construction. This resulted in a savings of two additional crews for two days; four crew days at \$9800. Cost savings of \$39,400.
10. Instead of mobilizing an Air Operations trailer with radio package, the Team utilized exclusive use helitack trucks that had radio packages at no cost. Cost savings of \$10,800.
11. Negotiated with Poudre Fire Authority to supply Aviation Crash Rescue Unit for a 50% discount. Cost savings of \$3575.
12. When available, utilized Exclusive Use Helicopters over Call When Needed (CWN) Helicopters. Cost savings of \$145,600.
13. The Team mobilizes with a trailer containing a computer system, printers, copier, and supply kits for 48 hours, projectors, table/chairs and network hardware. Cost savings of \$5,000 for this incident and future assignments.
14. Released 2 Type 2 contract hand crews and retained correctional crews. Cost savings of \$7,820.

Hewlett Fire Fire Progression Map May 14 – 19, 2012

